Departmental Bulletin Paper 価格競争下での垂直的構造選択とシュタッケルベルク均衡
Vertical Structure Selection and Stackelberg Equilibrium under Price
カカク キョウソウカ デノ スイチョクテキ コウゾウ センタク ト シュタッケルベルク キンコウ

鈴木, 浩孝  ,  スズキ, ヒロタカ  ,  Hirotaka, SUZUKI

In this paper, the duopolistic manufacturer’s vertical structure selection under multistage transaction is examined. The result is as follows. If vertical transaction is done by two-part tariff, vertical separation is weakly dominant strategy. The equilibrium is the symmetric type of this strategy set, as well as the asymmetric type of other strategy set. The asymmetric equilibrium exists because manufacturer’s vertical structure selection has the same effect as move selection in price competition. Therefore, the asymmetric equilibrium appears as the Stackelberg equilibrium though retail price is decided simultaneously. For the same reason, asymmetric equilibrium appears if vertical transaction is done by linear pricing. However, it appears only when the product’s homogeneity is somewhat high, because manufacturer cannot have all the effect of relaxing competition by vertical separation.

Number of accesses :  

Other information