Departmental Bulletin Paper チャネル間における価格-価格競争のもとでのテリトリー制
Exclusive Territories under Price-Price Competition between Channels
チャネルカン ニ オケル カカク カカク キョウソ ノ モト デノ テリトリーセイ

鈴木, 浩孝  ,  成生, 達彦  ,  スズキ, ヒロタカ  ,  ナリウ, タツヒコ  ,  Hirotaka, SUZUKI  ,  Tatsuhiko, NARIU

Suppose that a duopolistic manufacturer sells its products to two markets through its affiliated retailers. Also suppose that the manufacturers compete in price and the retailers do so in each stage. Then, if the manufacturers extract franchise fee from their retailers, the choice of exclusive territory is a dominant strategy. But if they do not, the choice is a dominant strategy only when the degree of product substitution is sufficiently high,whereas not to choose is a dominant strategy when their products are differentiated to some extent. Further, if they can choose to extract franchise fee or not, extracting it and choosing exclusive territory is a dominant strategy. These results are caused by the vertical ntegration/separation effect and the Stackelberg competition.

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