紀要論文 Environmental Policy for Non-point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly

松本 昭夫  ,  中山 惠子  ,  Ferenc  SZIDAROVSZKY

内容記述
 This study investigates the effectiveness of ambient charges under non-point source (NPS) pollutions in a imperfect competition framework. To this end, following Ganguli and Raju(2012), it constructs a one-stage game and a two-stage game in which Bertrand duopolistic fi…rms choose their best prices and abatement technology, respectively. It is demonstrated in both games that an increase in the ambient charge can lead to a decrease in pollution. This finding indicates that the ambient charge can efficiently control pollution in a Bertrand duopoly.
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http://ir.c.chuo-u.ac.jp/repository/search/binary/p/10739/s/9725/

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