Departmental Bulletin Paper Masahiko Aoki’s Conception of Institutions

瀧澤 弘和

 The present study examines Masahiko Aoki’s continual attempts to conceptualize institutions, with main focus on Aoki (2001) and Aoki (2011). The unique aspect of his approach is identified as his efforts to grasp the dynamic and collective-cognitive nature of institutions. Highly valuing this uniqueness, I identified several difficulties in this approach. In this study, I argue that the profound nature of institutions is beyond the formal description of game theory, which Aoki maintained in his lifetime. I also that the Hegelian perspective submitted by Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev (2014) suggests a possible future direction of the research on institutions in economics, albeit not necessarily one amenable to mathematical formulation.

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