Departmental Bulletin Paper 持続的相互協力状態発現の判定基準
Three Criteria on Judging Sustainable Cooperation

塩村, 尊  ,  大田, 圭佑

46pp.23 - 39 , 2017-07-20 , 関西大学総合情報学部
This paper presents three criteria that can automatically judge whether sustainable cooperation finally emerges in an iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Using the three criteria, we numerically confirm that the potential for developing a sustainably cooperative state increases, if we use simple genetic algorithm in conjunction with elite preservation in either of the two meanings as a learning process: One is usual elite preservation and the other referred to elite preservation in the strong sense. The game has a bias in the initial distribution of strategies and evaluates the player’s payoff independently of the environment. We emphasize that sustainable cooperation becomes inevitable if we use elite preservation in the strong sense, when there is at least one grim trigger strategy in the initial distribution. Moreover, we demonstrate the difficulty of sustainable cooperation under the environment-dependent evaluation. Since there is no common definition of sustainable cooperation among researchers, our criteria might indicate some ambiguity. The criteria, however, seem to contribute to shortening the hours for interpreting the results of numerical calculations and analyzing them objectively.

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