Technical Report Securely Implementable Social Choice Functions in Divisible and Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Utility Functions

NISHIZAKI, Katsuhiko

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平成26年関西大学若手研究者育成経費
This paper is a product of research which was finacially supported (in part) by the Kansai University Subsidy for Supporting Young Scholars (2014)“Robustness of Secure Implementation”
This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo,T., T. Sjӧstrӧm, and T. Yamato (2007) 〝Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjӧstrӧm, and Yamato (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, T. (1973) 〝Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41, pp.617-631) are securely implementable in some of the economies, we have the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions.
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