学術雑誌論文 QUOIN: Incentive Mechanisms for Crowd Sensing Networks

OTA, Kaoru  ,  DONG, Mianxiong  ,  GUI, Jinsong  ,  LIU, Anfeng

32 ( 2 )  , pp.114 - 119 , 2018-02-07 , IEEE
ISSN:0890-8044
内容記述
Crowd sensing networks play a critical role in big data generation where a large number of mobile devices collect various kinds of data with large-volume features. Although which information should be collected is essential for the success of crowd-sensing applications, few research efforts have been made so far. On the other hand, an efficient incentive mechanism is required to encourage all crowd-sensing participants, including data collectors, service providers, and service consumers, to join the networks. In this article, we propose a new incentive mechanism called QUOIN, which simultaneously ensures Quality and Usability Of INformation for crowd-sensing application requirements. We apply a Stackelberg game model to the proposed mechanism to guarantee each participant achieves a satisfactory level of profits. Performance of QUOIN is evaluated with a case study, and experimental results demonstrate that it is efficient and effective in collecting valuable information for crowd-sensing applications.
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