学術雑誌論文 An incentive game based evolutionary model for crowd sensing networks

LIU, Xiao  ,  OTA, Kaoru  ,  LIU, Anfeng  ,  CHEN, Zhigang

9 ( 4 )  , pp.692 - 711 , 2016-07 , Springer
ISSN:1936-64421936-6450
NII書誌ID(NCID):AA1252589X
内容記述
Crowd sensing networks can be used for large scale sensing of the physical world or other information service by leveraging the available sensors on the phones. The collector hopes to collect as much as sensed data at relatively low cost. However, the sensing participants want to earn much money at low cost. This paper examines the evolutionary process among participants sensing networks and proposes an evolutionary game model to depict collaborative game phenomenon in the crowd sensing networks based on the principles of game theory in economics. A effectively incentive mechanism is established through corrected the penalty function of the game model accordance with the cooperation rates of the participant, and corrected the game times in accordance with it’s payoff. The collector controls the process of game by adjusting the price function. We find that the proposed incentive game based evolutionary model can help decision makers simulate evolutionary process under various scenarios. The crowd sensing networks structure significantly influence cooperation ratio and the total number of participant involved in the game, and the distribution of population with different game strategy. Through evolutionary game model, the manager can select an optimal price to facilitate the system reach equilibrium state quickly, and get the number of participants involved in the game. The incentive game based evolutionary model in crowd sensing networks provides valuable decision-making support to managers.
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