テクニカルレポート Robust Voting under Uncertainty

NAKADA, Satoshi  ,  NITZAN, Shmuel  ,  UI, Takashi

2017-12 , Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
内容記述
This paper proposes normative consequentialist criteria for voting rules under Knightian uncertainty about individual preferences to characterize a weighted majority rule (WMR). The criteria stress the significance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized individual preferences. A voting rule is said to be robust if, for any probability distribution of preferences, responsiveness of at least one individual is greater than one-half. Our main result establishes that a voting rule is robust if and only if it is a WMR without ties. This characterization of a WMR avoiding the worst possible outcomes complements the well-known characterization of a WMR achieving the optimal outcomes, i.e., efficiency regarding responsiveness.
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http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/28978/1/070_hiasDP-E-60.pdf

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