This article reviews the prevailing orthodoxy about Nobusuke Kishi’s behavior in regrouping of the conservative parties in the 1950s （Hoshu-gōdō） with a focus on his conception on the subject of Japanese economic reconstruction. Kishi had been a member of the ruling Conservative Party （Jiyū-tō） since 1953. Kishi’s behavior in the Hoshu-Goudou has been understood in term of his political beliefs of aspiring to self-dependent rehabilitation （dokuritu-no-kansei）, which was amending the Constitution for remilitarization and revising the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty based on equality. By contrast, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s avoidance of amending the Constitution to gradually expand defense power in order to give priority to economic reconstruction, is referred to as the Yoshida Doctrine later. Therefore, Kishi’s proposed political adjustments were considered to be a campaign to topple the Yoshida government to achieve his political beliefs. This article insists that the primary confrontation between Yoshida and Kishi is the guiding principle of economic reconstruction. Yoshida’s conception of economic reconstruction was based on laissez-faire economics such as neoliberalism. As opposed to Yoshida, Kishi’s conception was based on economic intervention by the government and laid weight on management-labor cooperation. For this very reason, Kishi sought to mobilize Conservative politicians to stabilize the government’s handling of the discourse regarding amendment of the Constitution, and change the ruling Party to a new Progressive Conservative Party. It was similar to the CDU（the Christlich Demokratische Union） in West Germany. In fact, Kishi as a Progressive Conservative Party secretary general directed the drafting of long-term economic planning and improvement of the social security policy to prompt management-labor cooperation.