Technical Report Natural Implementation with Semi-responsible-sincere Agents in Pure Exchange Economies

Lombardi, Michele  ,  Yoshihara, Naoki

2016-08 , Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsible-sincerity. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsible-sincerity if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible-sincere agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in a non-responsible-sincere manner when a responsible-sincere behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of e¢ cient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identi.ed provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible-sincere. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

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