Technical Report 経営者の在職期間と業績予想

石田, 惣平  ,  蜂谷, 豊彦

2016-06 , Graduate School of Commerce and Management Center for Japanese Business Sutdies, Hitotsubashi University
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether top executive's incentives to bias earnings forecasts change during their tenure. We find that top executives in the early years of their service release more aggressive forecast earnings by discretional forecast management. In addition, this study analyzes whether the probability that actual earnings fall below forecast earnings is higher in the early years than in the later years of their service. This results reveal that the probability is lower in the early years of their tenure. We also find that top executives in the early years of their service discretionally cut expenditures such as R&D and advertising expenditures to meet forecast earnings.

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