Technical Report 経営者の在職期間と損失回避を意図した利益調整

石田, 惣平  ,  蜂谷, 豊彦

2016-06 , Graduate School of Commerce and Management Center for Japanese Business Sutdies, Hitotsubashi University
Description
First version: May 2015, This version: June 2016
本研究は経営者の在職期間と損失回避を意図した利益調整との関係を分析している.主たる発見事項は次の通りである.ひとつは,経営者の在職期間と会計発生高による損失回避との間には統計的に有意な関係はない.いまひとつは,就任間もない経営者ほど損失を回避するために支出を裁量的に削減する.これらの検証に加えて,本研究ではどのようなコーポレート・ガバナンス・メカニズムが経営者の機会主義的行動を抑制するのかについても分析を行った.分析の結果,機関投資家持株比率が高い企業ほど就任間もない経営者が損失回避を意図した利益調整を行う可能性は低下するのに対して,社外取締役比率が高くとも経営者による機会主義的行動は抑制されないことが明らかとなった.これらの結果は,日本の経営者はキャリア・コンサーンの問題から損失回避を意図した利益調整を行うこと,および機関投資家といったガバナンス・システムが経営者の機会主義的行動を抑制することを示唆している.
We examine the relation between the tenure of top executives and earnings management to avoid loss. The main findings are as follows. First, there is no statistically significant relation between their tenure and loss avoidance through accruals. Second, the probability that top executives discretionally cut expenditures such as R&D and advertising expenditures to avoid loss is higher in the early years of their service than in the later years. This study also analyzes which corporate governance mechanism is able to restrain such opportunistic behavior. The results indicate that the practice of earnings management by top executives to avoid loss in the early years of their service decreases with institutional ownership. However, it does not vary with the proportion of outside directors on the board. These findings suggest that although Japanese top executives manage earnings to avoid loss out of concern for their careers, a governance mechanism involving institutional investors is likely to inhibit their opportunistic behavior.
Full-Text

http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/27949/1/070hjbsWP_197.pdf

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