Technical Report 経営者の在職期間と損失回避を意図した利益調整

石田, 惣平  ,  蜂谷, 豊彦

2016-06 , Graduate School of Commerce and Management Center for Japanese Business Sutdies, Hitotsubashi University
First version: May 2015, This version: June 2016
We examine the relation between the tenure of top executives and earnings management to avoid loss. The main findings are as follows. First, there is no statistically significant relation between their tenure and loss avoidance through accruals. Second, the probability that top executives discretionally cut expenditures such as R&D and advertising expenditures to avoid loss is higher in the early years of their service than in the later years. This study also analyzes which corporate governance mechanism is able to restrain such opportunistic behavior. The results indicate that the practice of earnings management by top executives to avoid loss in the early years of their service decreases with institutional ownership. However, it does not vary with the proportion of outside directors on the board. These findings suggest that although Japanese top executives manage earnings to avoid loss out of concern for their careers, a governance mechanism involving institutional investors is likely to inhibit their opportunistic behavior.

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