
On Stable and StrategyProof Rules in Matching Markets with ContractsOn Stable and StrategyProof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts 
"/HIRATA, Daisuke/"HIRATA, Daisuke ,
"/KASUYA, Yusuke/"KASUYA, Yusuke
20150925 , Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Description
This paper studies stable and (onesided) strategyproof matching rules in manytoone matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one. Second, the doctoroptimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is shown to be the unique candidate for a stable and strategyproof rule. Third, a stable and strategyproof rule, when exists, is shown to be secondbest optimal for doctor welfare, in the sense that no individuallyrational and strategyproof rule can dominate it. This last result is further generalized to nonwasteful and strategyproof rules. Notably, all those results are established without any substitutes conditions on hospitals' choice functions, and hence, the proofs do not rely on the "rural hospital" theorem. We also show by example that the outcomes of a stable and strategyproof rule do not always coincide with those of the cumulative offer process; hence, the above results hold NOT because the cumulative offer process is the only candidate for stable and strategyproof rules.
FullText
http://hermesir.lib.hitu.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/27590/1/070econDP1510.pdf