紀要論文 FRIVOLOUS SUITS IN THE INFINITELY-REPEATED LITIGATION GAME WITH UNCERTAINTY

KIM, ILJOONG  ,  KIM, JAEHONG

56 ( 1 )  , pp.21 - 33 , 2015-06 , Hitotsubashi University
ISSN:0018-280x
NII書誌ID(NCID):AA00207547
内容記述
We explain why 'frivolous suits (FS)' occur particularly under complete information. Existing analyses such as the 'traditional' and the 'early-defense-cost' models are not fully robust in that they either drop the plaintiff's withdrawal option or rely on a restrictive assumption that the defendant loses immediately unless he early defends himself at high cost. We pursue a more generalized explanation. We offer an infinite-period litigation model with uncertainty which reflects the reality more consistently. We then show that FS can occur as a subgame perfect equilibrium since the defendant over the pre-trial stage may settle with FS to save future time and/or trial costs. We further demonstrate that FS can occur even under the British rule of fee shifting.
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http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/27196/1/HJeco0560100210.pdf

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