||Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
Nishihara, MichiShibata, Takashi
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
27 , 2017-07 , Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
We develop a dynamic model in which a distressed firm optimizes the bankruptcy choice and its timing. When the distressed firm’s shareholders sell the assets, they are better informed about the asset value than outsiders are. We show that this asymmetric information can delay the asset sales to signal asset quality to outsiders. More debt and lower asset value can reduce the signaling cost and mitigate the asset sales delay. Notably, we show that the firm changes the bankruptcy choice from selling out to liquidation bankruptcy when the signaling cost associated with selling out is high. This distortion in the bankruptcy choice greatly lowers the debt value, whereas it has a weak impact on the equity value.