||Stability and Universal Implementability of the Price Mechanism
Shiraishi, Kohzo ,
Urai, KenMurakami, Hiromi
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
6 , 2017-04 , Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
This paper provides a unified viewpoint on some axioms in social choice theory and a setting for the allocation mechanism with messages in the informational efficiency problem. In particular, our arguments are concerned with the category theoretical axiomatic method in Sonnenschein (1974) and the replica stability axiom in the social choice arguments like Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa (1994). The unified view enables us to obtain an extension of Sonnenschein's axiomatic characterization of the price mechanism as an agent-characteristics form dictionary property to a utility form economy-dependent universal implementability theorem.