||建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察（三） : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第2～3巻（1948年6月1日～6月16日）に見る第一次停戦受諾とイスラエル国境・アラブ難民帰還問題をめぐる論議
An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel (3) : The Debates over the Acceptance of the First Truce, the Israeli Borders, and the Repatriation of the Arab Refugees in The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings Vol.2-3, 1 to 16 June 1948
394 , 2016-03 , 東京大学東洋文化研究所
This paper gives an introduction to The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings Vol2-3 (1 to 16 June 1948) and gives a review of its main contents, the Arab question. As a follow-up to my previous papers published in this journal in March 2014 and March 2015, it is also intended to be a preliminary step toward revisiting the formative years of Israel, this time focusing on the first half of June 1948. It was during this time that the United Nations Security Council resolution of the First Truce (11 June to 8 July) was accepted by the Israeli provisional government, that various problems surrounding the Truce were seriously discussed, and most importantly, that a consensus crystallized in the cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 about a possibility of change in Israeli borders designated in the United Nations Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 and a policy of blocking the repatriation of Palestinian Arab refugees. A close examination of the proceedings brings us to the following two main conclusions. First, as far as these two weeks are concerned, any answer to the question of whether an expulsion policy existed belongs to a grey zone due to the fact that numerous parts of the proceedings were censored. Second, the cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 was a turning point not in policies, as the traditional wisdom suggests, but in political thinking. As to the policies, the consensus crystallized on 16 June was virtually a logical extension of previous cabinet meetings. However, what Shertok, Ben- Gurion, and Zisling said respectively in their lengthy speeches about the justification for blocking the return of refugees did, in fact, become the official view of history adopted by Israeli governments, right or left, for more than half a century when denying refugees’ right of return. "Palestinian Arabs," according to this official view, "became refugees voluntarily of their own will; they just fled and abandoned their villages. Therefore, Israelis are not responsible whatsoever for their becoming refugees." This historical view, which over time became the national narrative, was for the first time publicly and extensively narrated and shared among the top echelon of the Israeli government on 16 June. At the same time, the concept of a "civil state," which was still a viable option for the provisional government until the end of May 1948, waned and collapsed, while territorial "Judaization" rapidly became a top political priority during the First Truce, when "abandoned" Arab villages were demolished and new Jewish settlements were built on those same sites on a massive scale. The cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 was crucial, in retrospect, in that it became the watershed of Israeli national political thinking by precipitating the eventual crystallization of nationally-held historical views concerning the justification for Palestinians’ loss of homeland.