Global Financial Crisis, Ownership Change, and Corporate Governance Evolution Firm-Level Evidence from RussiaGlobal Financial Crisis, Ownership Change, and Corporate Governance Evolution Firm-Level Evidence from Russia
9252015-07 , Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
In this paper, using panel data of industrial firms obtained from unique questionnaire surveys conducted all over the Russian Federation in 2005 and 2009, we trace structural change in corporate governance systems before and after the global financial crisis and empirically examine their determinants. We found that, during this period, Russian firms improved the quality of corporate governance across the entire industrial sector. Furthermore, our empirical evidence strongly supports a hypothesis regarding the relationship between outside ownership and board composition as well as that concerning the impact of outside directorship on the audit system. Meanwhile, our estimation results also indicate the possibility that the global financial crisis has brought about asymmetric changes, in the sense that it enhanced the independence of corporate boards, while it deteriorated the independence of the audit system, thus, partially rejecting our prediction with respect to the disciplinary effect of the crisis on the corporate governance system.