There are two standpoints in Husserl’s phenomenology: subjectivism and historicism. According to Husserl’s subjectivism, things are constituted by an act of consciousness. For example, a desk is constituted (perceived) only if some appearances are regarded as the manner in which the desk is given to consciousness. The same explanation applies to ideal objects. For instance, the number “5” is constituted (known) only if a subject regards a certain representation of a group (such as a group of apples) as the manner in which “5” is given. However, Husserl also emphasizes the historical structure of knowledge of ideal objects. From this perspective, ideal objects are thought to have a public nature in the sense that they are possessed by humankind before being known by each subject. Thus, it is clear that the range of this historical interest is not entirely contained in that of the subjective one. We must ask how these two standpoints relate to each other in Husserl’s phenomenology. We confront a serious discrepancy between subjectivism and historicism, especially when we identify the former with “non-historical apriorism” because of the following idea: the evidence of knowledge is found only in individual subjects who actually recognize it. It is true that this kind of apriorism is incompatible with historicism, which focuses on the intersubjective aspect of our knowledge. I do not interpret Husserl’s phenomenology as an apriorism in the above sense. The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical or intersubjective aspect of the theory of constitution and to suggest a consistent understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology. For this purpose, I want to clear the historical immanence of intentional consciousness by referring to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry.