紀要論文 ブラッドリーの判断論と初期ラッセルの判断概念

伊藤, 遼  ,  Ito, Ryo

13pp.16 - 25 , 2018-06-21 , 名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
内容記述
This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.
ファイル公開日:2018年6月21日
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