Departmental Bulletin Paper 善と個人 : 個人における共同的な善への服従について

田村, 均  ,  Tamura, Hitoshi

61pp.15 - 43 , 2015-03-31 , 名古屋大学文学部
In this paper, I suggest it to be the case that an individual would end up submitting herself to the surrounding collectivity if she would like to make a deed of love and sacrifice. In other words, the concept of self-sacrifice cannot be made compatible with that of a rational individual with autonomy. In the recent philosophical literature, we have a puzzling proposition named "the argument from self-sacrifice." It says that if an individual rationally pursues the best thing for her to do, then she cannot make a self-sacrificial act. It is simply because what she has done cannot truly sacrifice anything of her since it is the best thing for her to do ex hypothesi. I take the argument seriously and positively. I will show that two counterarguments fail to disprove it, one of which is proposed by M. C. Overvold, the other by C. Heathwood. I then go on to propose my view, which looks on an act of self-sacrifice as a joint action made by the agent and her beloved person or persons. When an action can be correctly called self-sacrifice, the agent must divide her self into two pieces, one of which is the victim and the other the sacrificer. She is not an individual, or an indivisible being, because she falls into a moral split. If she goes on to abandon something of her for the sake of others on her own decision, the resulted act cannot be self-sacrificial since she must have chosen the best thing to do. So she should have acted not on her own decision but on some scenario supplied by some being other than her. She plays a role in the scenario, which tells her to do the right thing. Such a scenario very often has its origin in the tradition of the society or culture. Then we find it to be the case that an agent of a self-sacrificial act submits herself to the surrounding collectivity which tells her what is the righteous thing to do.

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