||ヒュームとウィトゲンシュタイン : 懐疑論に対するストローソンの自然主義を批判する
Hume and Wittgenstein: Making Remarks on the Way of Naturalism with Scepticism by Strawson P. F.
橋本, 哲Hashimoto, Satoshi
96 , 2015-03-31 , 名古屋大学文学部
Strawson argues that there is another way with scepticism which is not an attempt directly to refute it by rational argument drawing on commonsense or theological or quasi-scientific considerations. Vis-à-vis traditional scepticism he proposes the naturalist position. He considers a response which dose not so much attempt to meet the challenge as to pass it by. In characterizing the position he yokes Wittgenstein to Hume. In his naturalism Strawson dose not examine the reason for the certainty with 'unshakeable thing', but argues only the causes of them. According to Wittgenstein, certainty belongs to 'unshakeable thing' that underlies all our ordinary language-games. In the entire system of our language-games 'unshakeable thing' belongs to the foundation of it and the whole language-games rests on this kind of certainty. Ordinary language-games such as about knowledge, doubt, belief, etc. make sense only when our language-game has 'unshakeable thing' as foundation. The status of 'unshakeable things' can be conceived as propositions of grammar; in the system of our empirical propositions they have a peculiar logical role, that is, they have the character of a rule. Strawson fails to grasp the point of view about the system of our language-games.