||ジョン・ロールズの寛容論 : 相対主義と構成主義の観点から
Rawlsian Toleration : From the Perspectives of Moral Relativism and Constructivism
69 , 2018-03-01 , 九州大学大学院地球社会統合科学府
This paper argues how Rawlsian toleration faces the difficulty of tolerating the intolerant from the perspectives of moral relativism and constructivism. In the works of John Rawls, to tolerate the intolerant is the one of his themes through A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples. The Rawlsian toleration could be characterized as a duty of citizens in a just society and a finitude of reason, both of which may define the scope of the intolerant. However, these two features entail risks to dissolve the objective criteria of tolerating the intolerant in public political culture. In this study, I attempt to clarify the structure of Rawlsian toleration and its problems by comparing the approaches of Michal Walzer and Rainer Forst. Firstly, Rawlsian toleration may turn out to be a narrow view on social institutions, which promote tolerance through the criticism by Walzer. In On Toleration, Walzer criticized Rawlsian approach to toleration as unhelpful since its abstract nature could not properly grasp the phenomenon of toleration. In terms of moral relativism, the alternative approach of Walzer reveals Rawlsian toleration to be a one-dimensional way of perceiving the connection of tolerance with social institutions. Secondly, Rawlsian toleration is supposed to be dependent on public political culture. As Forst pointed out regarding the problems of political constructivism in Political Liberalism, Rawlsian toleration misses a firm moral foundation to provide the criteria for tolerating the intolerant. This ambiguity may lead to a theoretical difficulty of defining how ethical claims in conflicts should be dealt with and could be rejected as intolerant.